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TAXATION
CONCLUSION
Considering this group of cases as a whole there is some indication of
a judicial trend to give more than lip service to the statutory admonition
to accord this law a liberal interpretation to accomplish its underlying
purpose.
15
EDWIN R. TEPLE
TAXATION
REAL PROPERTY TAX
Exemptions for Charitable Institutions
Many cases have come before the Supreme Court of Ohio involving
tax exemption of real estate. Two interesting fact situations involving
this issue were decided by the supreme court during the year 1961.
In Columbus Youth League v. Board of Revision1 taxpayer, admit-
tedly a charitable institution within the purview of the real estate tax ex-
emption statute,2 had purchased a baseball stadium called the Jet Sta-
dium, home field of the Columbus Jet baseball team. Taxpayer then
entered into a lease with the Columbus Baseball Club, a professional
baseball team, for the use of the stadium, and the rentals received there-
under were used to pay the purchase money mortgage on the stadium.
When the stadium was not in use by the professional team, it was used
without charge for high school and other youth baseball games as well as
for other youth activities sponsored by taxpayer in furtherance of its social
welfare program. When the stadium was completely paid for it was to
be used exclusively in such a manner so as to benefit and help the under-
privileged, sick, and handicapped youth of Columbus and its environs.
The issue was whether the stadium property was "used exclusively for
charitable purposes" so as to be exempt from taxation under the statute.
The supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, restated the well established
rule "that it is the use of the property and not the use of the proceeds
derived therefrom which is determinative of the question of tax exemp-
tion"3 and affirmed the Board of Tax Appeal's denial of the application
for exemption.
The question of when real estate owned by a charitable institution
becomes exempted from taxation was considered in another supreme
YALE LJ. 123, 125 (1945). On the interstate claims procedure, see Edelman, Interstate
Arrangement for the Determination and Payment of Interstate Claims, 10 OHIo ST. L.J. 127
(1949).
15. Ohio Revised Code section 4141A6 provides: "Sections 4141.04 to 4141A6, inclusive,
of the Revised Code shall be liberally construed."
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court case.' Taxpayer, a religious institution, purchased a parcel of va-
cant land in 1956 for the purpose of constructing a new church thereon.
From the time of purchase until commencement of construction in Sep-
tember of 1959, taxpayer held fund-raising drives, hired architects, made
surveys, and took other necessary steps incident to the erection of the pro-
posed church. During this period the property was never used for com-
mercial purposes. Applications for remission of taxes for 1958 and 1959
were denied, and an application for exemption from taxation for 1960
was dismissed without prejudice by the Board of Tax Appeals. The is-
sue presented before the supreme court was "whether vacant land pur-
chased by a religious institution for the purpose of erecting a church
thereon sometime in the future is entitled to exemption from taxation"
under the statute' or "whether there must be a present actual use for the
designated purpose before the right to exemption arises."6 In its opinion
the court referred to another recent case' in which it held, as to public
property, that present actual use was not necessary to exemption as long
as such public property was not devoted to a commercial use. The court
found no reason to come to a different conclusion regarding a non-gov-
ernmental entity and determined that taxpayer's property was entitled to
be exempt from taxation since it was shown that at the time application
for exemption was made, taxpayer was actively working toward actual use
of its property for a house of worship. In its conclusion, however, the
court stated that mere ownership is not sufficient to create a right to tax
exemption in a religious institution, but that such ownership must be
coupled with the purpose, shown by overt acts, that the property will be
devoted to an actual physical use for a religious purpose.
PERSONAL PROPERTY TAx
Statutory Construction Regarding the Intangible
Personal Property Tax
Because of increasing widespread investment in the stock market, it
appears that the following cases are deserving of attention.
The recent case of Weaver v. Bowers' interprets the term "income
1. 172 Ohio St. 156, 174 N.E.2d 110 (1961).
2. OHIo REV. CODE § 5709.12.
3. Columbus Youth League v. Board of Revision, 172 Ohio St. 156, 158, 174 N.E.2d 110,
111 (1961).
4. Holy Trinity Protestant Episcopal Church v. Bowers, 172 Ohio St. 103, 173 N.E.2d 682
(1961).
5. OHIO REV. CODE § 5709.07.
6. Holy Trinity Protestant Episcopal Church v. Bowers, 172 Ohio St. 103, 104, 173 N.E.2d
682, 683 (1961).
7. Carney v. Cleveland City School District, 169 Ohio St. 65, 157 N.E.2d 311 (1959).
8. 173 Ohio St. 1, 179 N.E.2d 50 (1962).
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yield" of intangibles for tax purposes as set forth in section 5701.10 of
the Ohio Revised Code. This section in part provides that in the case of
shares of stock, "income yield" means dividends paid or distributed,
whether such payment or distribution is in cash, or other property, "or
shares of stock, except stock of like kind of the corporation declaring the
dividend" and further excludes other specific types of corporate distribu-
tions. In the Weaver case taxpayer had received a distribution of non-
voting common stock as a one-for-one stock dividend on voting common
stock. The question before the supreme court was whether this stock
dividend was a distribution of "stock of like kind of the corporation de-
daring the dividend" and therefore excepted by the statute. The court
found that there were basically only two kinds of corporate stock, com-
mon and preferred, and based the distinction between the two only on
the preference in distribution of dividends and assets. It then concluded
that non-voting shares of common stock are shares of like kind with com-
mon shares having Voting rights, and held accordingly, that the distribu-
tion in question was excepted from the term "income yield" and was not
taxable as such.
On the same day that the Weaver case was decided, the supreme
court further interpreted the words "stock of like kind" in Cobourn v.
Bowers.' This case involved a distribution of a preferred-stock dividend
on a share-for-share basis to the holders of common stock. The taxpayer
contended that the distribution of preferred stock on a share-for-share
basis on common stock did not constitute a payment as income since this
distribution did not change the proportionate interest of the shareholders
in the company."0 The supreme court did not find taxpayer's argument
persuasive. It pointed out that taxpayer now had shares which gave him
preference as to dividends and preference upon liquidation, and that fur-
thermore the corporation had changed its capital structure by increasing
its stated capital and by reducing its earned surplus which might have
been available for dividend distribution." The court concluded that
since section 5701.10(B) specifically makes distributions of shares of
stock "income yield," excepting therefrom only those of "like kind," and
since preferred stock is not of "like kind" as to common stock, the distri-
bution in the instant case was within the definition of "income yield" and
therefore taxable.
It is submitted that the Weaver and Cobourn cases should have
9. 173 Ohio St. 5, 179 N.E.2d 354 (1962).
10. As support for this argument, taxpayer cited the leading federal income tax case, Eisner
v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), which held that a stock dividend did not change the
proportionate ownership of a shareholder was not income for federal income tax purposes.
11. It is to be noted that in Weaver v. Bowers, 173 Ohio St. 1, 179 N.E.2d 50 (1962), there
was also a change in the capitalization of the corporation by reason of the stock dividend,
though the court in that case did not comment upon it.
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reached the same result. That is, a stock dividend which does not change
the proportionate interest of the shareholders in the distributing corpora-
tion should not be considered "income yield" since shareholders have
nothing more after the distribution than they did before the stock divi-
dend. Taxation of intangibles in Ohio is based substantially upon the
income yielded by the intangible or upon the market value of the intan-
gible on tax listing day. Taxpayer in neither case received any benefit
by reason of the stock dividend, whether preferred on common or com-
mon on common. It is suggested that the words in section 5701.10(B)
"or shares of stock" in the phrase "whether such payment or distribution
is in cash, notes, debentures, bonds, other property, or shares of stock, ex-
cept stock of like kind" were not intended by the legislature to include a
stock dividend which did not change the proportionate interest of tax-
payer in the distributing corporation.
Inventory and the Tangible Personal Property Tax
A case worthy of note involving the tangible personal property tax
was Beerman Stores, Inc. v. Bowers. 2 The taxpayer owned several retail
stores in different taxing districts. Prior to taxpayer's tax listing date,
taxpayer's only store in one taxing district was destroyed by fire. Tax-
payer did not include in its tax return its average inventory of the de-
stroyed store for the ten months the store was operating in the year pre-
ceding the tax listing date. The Board of Tax Appeals agreed with the
taxpayer on the basis of section 5711.07 of the Ohio Revised Code, which
provides that "personal property used in business shall be listed and as-
sessed in the taxing district in which such business is carried on ...."
The Board concluded that since all of taxpayer's inventory in one taxing
district was destroyed by fire prior to its tax listing date, there was noth-
ing by way of inventory in that taxing district which could form a corpus
to tax. The supreme court reversed the Board and held that the inven-
tory of the destroyed store is subject to taxation even though it was not
in existence on tax listing date. The court reasoned that the basis of tax-
ation of tangible personal property is its use in business in this state,'" and
it thereby concluded that where a taxpayer has inventory in existence in
a taxing district for some part of a year, such inventory must be included
in the valuation of tangible personal property for tax purposes, there be-
ing no statutory requirement that the inventory be in existence on the tax
listing date.'4
12. 173 Ohio St. 59, 179 N.E.2d 521 (1962).
13. See OHIO REV. CODE § 5709.01 (Supp. 1961).
14. See OHIO REV. CODE § 5711.15 (Supp. 1961).
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INHERITANCE TAx
The Husband-Wife Survivor and Taxable Succession
Section 5731.02(E) of the Ohio Revised Code provides as follows:
Whenever property is held by two or more persons jointly, so that
upon the death of one of them the survivor has a right to the immediate
ownership or possession and enjoyment of the whole property, the
accrual of such right by the death of one of them shall be deemed a
succession taxable under this section, in the same manner as if the en-
hanced value of the whole property belonged absolutely to the deceased
person, and he had bequeathed the same to the survivor by will, provided
when the persons owning said property jointly are a husband and wife,
the survivor shall be deemed to have a succession taxable ta the extent
of one-half the total value of the property without regard to enhance-
ment. (Emphasis added.)
The proviso in italics was added by amendment to the statute in 1957.1"
Prior to the amendment all joint and survivorship property was subject
to the incidents of inheritance tax, the survivor having a taxable succession
equivalent to the decedent's actual contribution to the purchase price or
value of the property.1" However, by reason of the aforestated amend-
ment the rule is changed as to husband and wife, and the taxable succes-
sion is equivalent to one-half the total value of the property without
regard to actual contribution.
In In re Pierce's Estate,7 where the evidence showed that the funds
placed in a joint and survivorship account were obtained by the surviving
husband's business operations only and that the deceased wife had made
no contribution to the account, the court held that under the statute, the
account was taxable to the extent of one-half of the total value thereof.
It appears that the court in the Pierce case agreed that the Ohio inher-
itance tax is a tax upon the succession or the right of receiving property
from the decedent. However, the court concluded that when the surviv-
ing husband placed his property under a joint and survivorship arrange-
ment he gave up a "beneficial interest of absolute tide" to the property
and when he again regained "absolute tide" upon his wife's decease there
was a taxable succession within the meaning of the inheritance statutes.
It is submitted that this theory of succession is inappropriate. In theory
at least there is no more reason for denying the right to show contribution
in the husband-wife situation than there is in other succession cases where
contribution is given recognition."8
15. 127 Ohio Laws 128 (1957).
16. See Tax Comm. v. Hutchinson, 120 Ohio St. 361, 166 N.E. 352 (1929); In re Comb's
Estate, 90 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949); In re Schroeder's Estate, 144 N.E.2d 512 (Ohio
P. Ct. 1957); In re Kirkham's Estate, 34 Ohio L. Abs. 405 (Ohio P. Ct 1941).
17. 176 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio P. Ct. 1960).
18. See cases cited in note 16 supra.
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Considering a similar fact situation in In re McKees Estate19 another
court held that the surviving spouse could not show contribution under
authority of section 5731.02(E), as amended. The court in the McKee
case found that the legislature passed the amendment in question to avoid
the "confusion" that occurred when the surviving spouse was allowed to
show contribution. It is believed that the avoidance of confusion alone
should not make possible the levy of an inheritance tax where there is in
fact no succession because the surviving spouse made the entire contribu-
tion.
Two court of appeals cases also decided this issue in favor of the
state.2" In the Evans case, the decedent's wife purchased certain bonds
with her own money and took title to them in the name of herself or her
husband. The court of appeals reversed the probate court and held sec-
tion 5731.02(E) applicable, disagreeing with taxpayer's argument that
husband and wife situations should be treated in the same manner as
those in which other persons may show contribution. This court reasoned
that a husband and wife relationship is different in that the value of the
services of a wife in maintaining the home, rearing the children, and the
intimate relationship existing between the parties cannot be valued in
dollars and that it would be difficult to determine what such "services"
were worth and how much such services would enhance the value of
property accumulated. This court also stated that the surviving spouse
received an exclusive right to the bonds which she did not have during
the decedent's life and therefore received a taxable succession. In the
Kaski case, the court of appeals in a per curiam opinion reversed the pro-
bate court and upon the basis of section 5731.02 (E) alone, without any
other reason, held against the taxpayer. It will be interesting to see what
position the Supreme Court of Ohio will take in these cases.
Valuation of Stock
It appears that Ohio has rejected the "blockage rule" in valuing cor-
porate stocks for inheritance purposes. In a recent case before the Ohio
Supreme Court2' the deceased owned a large block of stock of a certain
corporation at the time of her death. Expert testimony was available
that if the entire block of stock was sold at one time it would depress the
market. The taxpayer contended that the mean over-the-counter value
of the stock at date of death should not be used but that a discounted
valuation must be accepted by reason of such decrease in value if the en-
tire block was sold. The supreme court found that under the terms of
19. 176 N.E.2d 380 (Ohio P. Ct. 1960).
20. In re Evan's Estate, 178 N.E.2d 104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961); In re Kaski's Estate, 177
N.E.2d 65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
21. In re Sear's Estate, 172 Ohio St. 443, 178 N.E.2d 240 (1961).
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